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As cloud computing grows, the private sector has a pivotal role to play in balancing the privacy needs 
of the individual and the security demands of the state. 
 
Abstract 
 
As technology integrates into every aspect of people’s daily lives, it’s easy to lose sight of the vast 
amounts of data generated by the devices and services that they’ve come to rely on. When 
productively harnessed through cloud-based technologies, this data has the ability to empower the 
individual. However, it also brings significant privacy challenges, particularly when states seek to 
leverage this same data to enhance law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. The authors suggest 
that the private sector has a pivotal role in establishing norms in this area and that doing so in a 
manner respectful of the individual is ultimately in everyone’s best interests. 
 
Introduction 
 
At the intersection of privacy and technology in cloud computing environments lies the private sector, 
which has played a significant role in shaping the development of cloud computing technology. 
Although technological development tends to be driven by the financial motivations of private-sector 
interests, its scale and ubiquity is ultimately mediated by individuals (all of us), who have come to 
rely on it in our daily lives. 
 
However, the devices and services that individuals depend on are increasingly collecting data about us 
at a scale and rate never before conceived. In parallel, as organizations seek to maximize the value of 
these vast swathes of data, the potential economies of scale achievable through cloud computing make 
it a compelling proposition for big data initiatives. This almost symbiotic relationship between big 
data and cloud computing means that the data will increasingly reside under the control of cloud 
service providers.
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 This trend is likely to accelerate as Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud-based 
solutions gain traction. Although our ability to harness this data productively empowers us as 
individuals, all too often our control over it is limited and potentially comes at the expense of our 
personal freedom. 
 
Similarly, law enforcement and intelligence arms of states across the globe are keenly aware of the 
empowering possibilities inherent in accessing the dense pockets of data that have developed as a 
result of cloud computing. Before the widespread adoption of cloud computing, the dispersed and 
often ephemeral nature of data concerning individuals didn’t as readily lend itself to aggregation and 
analysis. Its very nature made bulk collection for the purpose of preempting threats to public safety 
challenging, tedious, and resource intensive, even at the smallest scale. 
 
Although this is but a single aspect of far broader state “cyber” aspirations, which bring with them 
diverse implications for the private sector,
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 it is to a degree unique. In this instance, the private sector 
has found itself in the position of arbiter between the state’s desire for visibility into the daily lives of 
individuals, and the individual’s desire to control what, and with whom, to share. This position has 
become more pronounced since the emergence of cloud computing. The private sector has to an 
extent put itself into this position, and it might not be able to extricate itself. When it comes to the 
thorny question of how to balance privacy and surveillance, the private sector has a responsibility to 
contribute actively and meaningfully in any search for acceptable answers.
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Pivotal Role of the Private Sector 
 
Some might consider it unusual to look to the private sector to play a pivotal role in addressing wider 
societal issues surrounding privacy in cloud computing. Its reputation has been affected by 
“surveillance as a business model” being at the core of many online services.4 Despite this, when 
assessing the private sector’s role in the future of privacy, we need to take a more pragmatic approach. 
 
Looking at the existing distribution of personal data, both created by and generated about individuals, 
we can better appreciate that the cumulative data under the control of private interests provides greater 
insight into our lives than would normally reside under state control. This disparity between the 
volume and nature of data in private control, compared to state control, explains why we’ve seen such 
significant efforts on the part of states, effectively deputizing the private sector in data collection. 
 
Over time, much of the data states retain on individuals might also move into private-sector custody. 
We’re already seeing many governments take tentative steps toward migrating less sensitive functions 
to public cloud providers. It seems reasonable to assume that as comfort with cloud technologies 
grows, and if the level of cost efficiencies envisaged are realized, we’ll see a shift in perceived risk-to-
reward ratios. In turn, this could justify, at least in the eyes of some governments, migration of 
increasingly sensitive data to public cloud environments. In parallel, the desire of many states to 
engage in greater public–private partnerships with regard to increasingly sensitive services will ensure 
that even more data makes its way out of direct physical state control. 
 
The state’s willingness to expose its data on individuals to the private sector, while simultaneously 
seeking access to existing private-sector data, gives insight into state perceptions regarding where true 
value resides. Clearly, the private sector lies at the heart of the problem, and is therefore central in any 
viable solutions. 
 
Problems for the Private Sector 
 
“Private sector” is a nebulous term, encompassing a wide range of industries, structures, objectives, 
and challenges. With respect to privacy and the cloud, all face some fundamentally similar problems. 
 
Threats to Data and Reputation 
 
In an information-based economy, an enterprise’s two most valuable assets are data and reputation: 
data because it’s the raw material used in the creation of information; and reputation, not only because 
it’s the grease that in many cases lubricates data acquisition, but also because it increases the 
perceived integrity and therefore the value of the information generated. Additionally, there’s often a 
complex yet symbiotic relationship between these assets. The core problem for the private sector is 
that trying to balance the demands of states against individuals’ expectations of privacy will affect 
these assets’ value. 
 
Meanwhile, the accumulation of data about or from individuals, whether they’re customers, partners, 
employees, or users, is increasing. Often this data is considered innocuous and privacy considerations 
are rarely afforded much thought, particularly when the data is securely stored on internal systems. 
Once this data migrates to the cloud, however, the dynamics change. 
 
As data with similar “selectors” from multiple sources comes under the physical control of a single 
entity, its density increases its surveillance appeal. In parallel, the data’s security increasingly relies 
on a chain of assurances, invariably leading to it becoming decoupled from the relationship 
surrounding its initial collection. This is of particular concern where a veil of secrecy surrounds state 
access to data, and immunity from civil liability is extended to directly cooperating parties, since this 
raises questions as to how vociferously privacy concerns might be challenged in the absence of direct 
interest. The risks to reputation, and in particular trust perception, not to mention liability concerns, 
  
are problems that the private sector is just beginning to wrestle with. The quandary for the private 
sector is that managing and creating value from this ever-increasing mountain of data results in an 
insatiable appetite for computing services at costs and scales that are often prohibitive to provide 
internally. 
 
This fundamental undermining of trust speaks directly to a subtle, yet perceptible, devaluation of the 
reputations so carefully cultivated by many private-sector entities. Recent revelations into the 
relationships that have developed between states and some private sector interests haven’t helped. In 
some cases, these appear to have been based on exploitation or coercion; in others, they’ve raised 
suspicions of collusion. This has undermined trust, not just between individuals and the private sector, 
but also within the private sector itself. 
 
If customers believe their privacy is under threat, their choice of provider will be heavily biased by 
trust considerations, or they might choose not to use a service at all. This is of particular concern to 
the private sector, since negative perception can significantly influence consumer decisions, 
particularly in competitive markets where product differentiation is often tenuous. 
 
Threats to Flexibility 
 
The evolution of cloud computing is a reflection of economic imperative. At a physical level, it’s 
driven by developments in the underlying technologies that make computing possible. Although the 
individual projections of Gordon Moore, Mark Kryder, and Gerry Butters might strain over time, 
when combined they highlight the dynamic nature of “economically optimal” computing.5 The ability 
to flexibly adapt to this ever-evolving computing ideal, allowing providers to cost-effectively utilize, 
modify, and scale their environments to meet changing needs, is in part what makes it attractive. This 
architectural flexibility, when combined with cost efficiencies derived from scale, gives customers 
access to computing capabilities they might not have ordinarily been able to afford. 
 
Insertion of the state into this equation, however, raises issues for the provider and potentially affects 
the service level. For example, having to implement state surveillance capabilities within a cloud 
architecture complicates decisions, inhibits flexibility, restricts change, and invariably increases 
operational costs. All of this erodes provider competitiveness. 
 
Threats to Innovation 
 
It’s also important to consider that the form state surveillance capabilities take can impact innovation. 
A physical surveillance infrastructure will primarily cause operational difficulties for providers. But 
physical surveillance infrastructures in cloud environments is of limited use since it can’t match the 
elasticity and scalability of the environment it needs to process, making it less than ideal for bulk 
surveillance.  
 
Because software is at the core, a more sensible technical approach would be to develop state 
surveillance capabilities at this level. In such cases, the state would likely seek to exercise some 
influence over technological developments, thereby ensuring that its capabilities are maintained and 
its investment protected. Likewise certain advances, though advantageous from a technological 
perspective, might be abandoned under pressure from the state if they have potential to inhibit 
surveillance. Overall, a situation such as this would likely see the state position itself as final arbiter 
on innovation. 
 
Paradoxically, the state doesn’t even need to be directly involved to stifle innovation. Revelations of 
the pressures exerted by states to ensure the advancement of surveillance efforts undoubtedly have a 
cooling effect on the development and provisioning of privacy-enhancing technologies. On the one 
hand, private-sector entities must consider the potential repercussions of drawing the state’s ire, and 
  
on the other hand, the secrecy that surrounds state efforts to compromise such technologies means that 
distrust has become the default initial response to any such innovations. 
 
Threats to Data Movement and Competitiveness 
 
It’s important to recognize that privacy issues extend well beyond the actions of the intelligence 
services of a few states. Most states are engaged, or aspire to engage, in many of the same activities 
recently documented for the Five Eyes nations.
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 Although the Edward Snowden revelations forced 
questions about privacy onto the global stage and brought them to the forefront of many state agendas, 
the focus of these agendas has in many cases revolved around issues of sovereignty, capability 
sharing, and boundaries on the surveillance of state officials, rather than around individual privacy. 
 
Indeed, a common trend among many states is to advocate for the retention and processing of their 
citizens’ and residents’ data within their respective jurisdictions, believing that this will address 
privacy issues. Unfortunately, this has more to do with issues of sovereignty than privacy. In real 
terms, we know little about the activities of the US and its partners, but we know even less about 
similar activities by other states. This is cold comfort for the individuals concerned about their 
privacy, or for private-sector entities operating in a global economy. 
 
The specter of restrictions on the movement of data creates operational difficulties for private-sector 
entities trying to compete internationally, particularly where cloud computing is concerned. At a 
fundamental level, this geographical constraint undermines the economic underpinnings of the cloud 
concept. For larger cloud providers and customers, this “Balkanization” inhibits the elasticity of cloud 
services, resulting in an inability to fully realize the cost advantages. For small niche players, it has an 
even greater impact because it restricts their ability to compete globally, and in turn inhibits further 
innovation, particularly with innovations where viability relies on scale. This in turn ensures that only 
large providers that can afford to invest in dedicated infrastructure at multiple locations across the 
globe can compete. Although this scenario might at first glance appeal to large players, the resultant 
impact on innovation potentially restricts their options to access new technology streams through 
acquisition. It’s also noteworthy that states are becoming distrustful of companies based on national 
origin.
7
 The “incentivization” of domestic cloud providers potentially undermines the competitiveness 
of international providers and inhibits market access. 
 
The Challenge for the Private Sector 
 
Ultimately, issues related to privacy are a major, sometimes disregarded, source of problems for the 
private sector, and they’ll become more so as reliance on cloud environments grows and global 
markets become more competitive. The challenges left to the private sector are balancing the privacy 
needs of the individual and the needs of the state as cloud computing grows, and determining what 
role it should play in this process. 
 
When considering policy and law in relation to technology, semantic differences are often the biggest 
obstacles. The lack of a common nomenclature across disciplines leads to misinterpretation among 
stakeholders, which in turn leads to fractious debate. Being mindful of this potential for 
misinterpretation is particularly important for the technical community. Technicians must convey to 
other disciplines knowledge not only of the capabilities and limitations of technology, but also of the 
physical world implications of technology. Likewise, a greater level of technical literacy is required 
from those in other disciplines attempting to address privacy problems since the technology is 
complex and its implications far-reaching.  
 
When we look at cloud computing within the context of lawful data access and legitimate 
surveillance, one aspect is particularly relevant. At a basic level, “the cloud” conceptually refers to 
computing uninhibited by physical—and by extension geographical—constraints. This poses 
significant challenges when we then consider legitimate surveillance and lawful data access, as these 
  
activities have historically been bound by geography to cultural norms, jurisdiction, and 
sovereignty—concepts that are the antithesis of what “cloud” means to computing. 
 
Similar problems arise when looking at the idea of “privacy.” Like many important concepts, privacy 
isn’t easy to define universally. The concept of privacy and its role in society is underpinned by 
complex cultural norms and unique value systems that have developed and been refined over time, 
often within unique historical contexts. Adding to this diversity are the practical aspects of how an 
individual exercises privacy, and the dynamic nature of trust, which influences how an individual 
reinterprets trust over time. What is shared, with whom, and when, are all aspects of privacy that 
guarantee that one size will never fit all.  
 
The Role of the Private Sector in Solutions 
 
There are rarely easy or straightforward solutions to complex problems, particularly those with global 
dimensions. However, political, legal, and technological approaches can be taken to ease the gradual 
establishment of generally accepted norms, and the private sector has an important role to play in their 
development. 
 
The Need for International Consensus 
 
Although technology has an important role to play, political and legal problems can only be solved 
through political and legal means. Information technology is merely the newest arena within which 
societies are seeking to balance the needs of the state with the expectations of individuals. 
 
What is particularly complex is that the technologies we’re building bring with them a global, cross-
jurisdictional dimension, where concepts of physical distance and physical barriers have reduced 
relevance. For political and legal means to have a chance of addressing these problems, there first 
needs to be a sustainable level of consensus among states. In the current environment, where distrust 
and secrecy dominate the state’s involvement in technology, and heated dialogue centers on topics 
such as cyberespionage, cyberterrorism, and cyberweapons, individuals and their immediate needs 
tend to be forgotten. There’s an immediate need for productive multilateral discussion between 
states.
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 However, with few, if any, countries retaining sufficient moral authority to influence dialogue, 
the private sector could be the catalyst that changes the direction of discourse. 
 
The Role of Education 
 
Before contemplating any shifts in state attitudes, we need to help policymakers better understand and 
appreciate the societal and economic benefits of information technology. Historically, we’ve seen a 
wide range of interest groups espousing and promoting these benefits; however, the success of these 
efforts is questionable. Repeatedly we find ourselves in scenarios where state activities and 
aspirations, particularly with respect to intelligence and law enforcement, reach such proportions that 
they’re perceived as excessive by numerous individuals and private-sector entities. Once a trust deficit 
develops, the integrity of technologies from certain countries is questioned and relationships with 
some types of technology are reassessed. Sometimes this occurs to an extent that sentiment shifts risk 
damaging the technology sectors of the states involved, and inhibit the adoption of technological 
advancements in the private sector globally. 
 
The traditional attitude in the technology sector is that governments “don’t get it.” Perhaps it’s a 
generational problem, or perhaps a technical literacy issue, but recent events appear to confirm a need 
to redouble our efforts to improve governments’ understanding of technology and its implications for 
privacy. This is particularly important with respect to policymakers, because they can’t be ignored if 
technology and privacy are to have a cohesive future. It’s also important that efforts focus not just on 
what technology can do for the state and society, but also on the positive and negative impacts the 
state can have on technology and privacy. 
  
 
The private sector has an important role to play here. It has access and influence, but needs to use 
these far more progressively. Instead of focusing on advancing its own agendas, it needs to start 
thinking strategically. What’s needed is the careful creation of overarching initiatives, with broad 
private-sector support, aimed at promoting a common understanding of the issues and technologies 
among governments, with deference to the needs of the individual.  
 
Changes in Attitude 
 
Strategic thinking will require changes in the private sector’s perspectives and attitudes, but 
companies that transition might well flourish as their reputations increase. For example, companies 
that view the individual as “the product” rather than “the customer” might need to investigate more 
flexible business models, since exploiting privacy ignorance might not be sustainable if privacy 
awareness increases. 
 
Related to this is the need for individuals to decide what privacy is worth to them and pay for services 
accordingly. Educational, pricing, and business modelling research needs to be conducted. Ensuring a 
future Internet that balances security and privacy for all requires the participation of individuals, not 
just corporations. 
 
Transparency 
 
Events over the past few years have shone a spotlight on issues of transparency. In particular, its 
absence from state intelligence and law enforcement activities has caused significant headaches for 
private-sector entities. Secret interpretations of law, exercised in secret courts, ultimately engender an 
air of mistrust in a legal system’s integrity, which in turn gives rise to perceptions of underlying 
sinister intent. For private-sector entities that find themselves embroiled in controversies relating to 
rulings from such a legal system, and unable to discuss any aspect of their involvement as a result of 
legal orders, these perceptions are transitive. 
 
Although it might be necessary at times to shroud what is referred to as lawful data access and 
legitimate surveillance in a veil of secrecy, excessive secrecy in perpetuity is potentially 
counterproductive. States operating these types of legal regimes, and states moving toward them, need 
to carefully consider the potential consequences of their existence coming to light. 
 
The private sector needs to encourage governments globally, through engagement with 
representatives or through litigation where necessary, to put in place appropriate mechanisms that 
allow it to make public information about the government requests it receives. In parallel, the private 
sector needs to work in unison to consolidate this information, preferably through independent third 
parties, into a meaningful and accurate depiction of the state of privacy globally. This will provide 
greater transparency on not only what is happening in a given country, but also on how other 
countries compare. Additionally, it creates a valuable body of information that researchers across 
disciplines can use to bridge global gaps in privacy norms. 
 
Legality 
 
Although failures in certain government attitudes have played a significant role, the private sector has 
acted as an enabler.
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 Private-sector entities must ensure that all state collections of data in their 
custody are subject to the full rigors of the law, and that any requests they process are fundamentally 
lawful and necessary. Where doubts exist as to a request’s veracity or necessity, it must be challenged 
by all available means. Ultimately, private-sector entities must establish a reputation, supported by a 
substantial track record, of defending data in their custody with as much determination as the 
individual who provided it would afford. 
 
  
Once all avenues of challenge have been exhausted, private-sector entities need to ensure that they 
provide only what is legally required. Their responsibility doesn’t end there, however. The private 
sector needs to push for mechanisms to ensure that once data is handed over, it’s used only by those in 
government who need it, and then only for the purpose for which its collection was ordered. Further, 
it needs to ensure that the retention of this data in perpetuity is the exception rather than the norm. 
What isn’t required by the state, as defined by the criteria of its original collection, needs to be 
disposed of securely. 
 
Although these principles are applicable to all data, they’re particularly important with respect to 
metadata, which can pose a significant threat to privacy,
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 particularly once aggregated. Because of its 
nature, metadata can often be difficult to protect, from a privacy perspective, using purely 
technological means. Metadata creation must therefore be kept to a minimum and it should be 
retained only for as long as is necessary. 
 
At a more general level, it’s in the private sector’s best interest to ensure that it isn’t left alone in the 
spotlight when there are perceived excesses in the state’s exercise of power. The private sector must 
therefore push for the establishment of accountability and meaningful independent oversight, 
designed to inform policymakers on the programs and mechanisms used by government in its pursuit 
and collection of private-sector data. 
 
Empowering the Individual 
 
All the measures discussed thus far are, to an extent, limited but necessary. Their ability to influence 
norms will vary from state to state, depending on the mechanisms available to initiate change. Calls 
for balancing the privacy needs of the individual with the needs of the state are, for example, unlikely 
to garner much support in a tyranny. Although mileage might vary when it comes to political and 
legal means as instruments of change, technology has consistently proven to be a powerful instrument 
of change, with the ability to influence norms on a global scale. 
 
When we look at privacy based on all we’ve discussed thus far, we see the importance of the 
individual. We also see that meaningful privacy is shaped by individuals based on their needs and 
perspectives. Thus, from a technological perspective, we need to focus on empowering users, 
allowing them to translate their physical worldview of the trust relationships in their lives into an 
accurate digital representation. This isn’t a new concept, but thus far we’ve failed to develop privacy-
protecting tools that are user-friendly enough for the typical user. Sometimes the difficulty lies in the 
technology’s complexity; other times it comes down to a lack of technical literacy among users. 
 
Directly related to the concept of empowering users is diversity. We need to give individuals choices, 
not only in the tools they use to protect their privacy, but also in the ability to fine-tune how those 
tools implement those protections. This might seem contradictory to a user-friendly approach, but we 
need to find a way to reconcile these because, by permitting others to be the arbiters of an individual’s 
privacy, we’re allowing the societal stratification of privacy. Those with sufficient influence and 
power to protect their privacy will succeed; those with the technical knowledge to defend their 
privacy will try but their privacy will be under perpetual threat; and the majority will be left with little 
autonomy over their privacy. 
 
Zero-Knowledge Principles 
 
In relation to cloud computing we face a range of technical conundrums, primarily because it’s far 
more difficult for individuals to control what happens to their data on someone else’s system. We 
need a widespread adoption of “zero-knowledge principles,” where neither the cloud service provider 
nor anyone else, apart from data owners and their delegates, has visibility of unprotected data. 
Ultimately, this prevents the service provider from being able to act as a surrogate for the state’s 
  
actual target of investigation, relieving the service provider from associated legal, ethical, operational, 
and commercial burdens. 
 
Although there has been remarkable commercial progress in the storage-as-a-service arena in 
adopting these principles, a need remains for additional research and development in technologies and 
protocols to secure privacy across the broadest range of possible use cases, particularly 
collaboration.
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 Unfortunately, although the nature of storage-as-a-service lends itself particularly well 
to established technologies that can secure privacy, other cloud services are less fortunate. In 
particular, services where processing is conducted within the cloud face significant constraints in 
implementing zero-knowledge principles with existing technologies. Concepts such as fully 
homomorphic encryption
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 and program obfuscation
13
 could yield solutions but, although researchers 
have made significant strides in the recent past, progress toward practical application is only 
achievable through open and collaborative efforts among private-sector interests. 
 
The widespread availability of a diverse range of tools geared at protecting the privacy of individuals, 
when combined with an established widespread acceptance of zero-knowledge principles among 
cloud service providers, should, over time, shape international norms. This could be further 
strengthened by adherence to free software principles, which will enhance transparency, improve 
diversity, and, given sufficient private-sector support, lead to accelerated innovation.  
 
Overcoming Resistance 
 
Any approach seeking to balance privacy and state controls will invariably meet with some resistance 
from the state and its subordinates. Technological efforts, in particular, will meet with resistance.
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Fundamentally, it’s important that the private sector make the case that these efforts don’t prohibit the 
state from policing or conducting intelligence activities. They merely restrain a “collect it all” ethos 
from undermining the privacy of the majority. 
 
As has always been the case, no technical measure can completely inhibit the state from exercising its 
powers if it’s determined to target an individual. The state has technological capabilities that can 
make short work of personal computing devices and intercept data before privacy-protecting 
mechanisms come into play. Additionally, it has other levers of power at its disposal that can be 
exercised against the individual, and extend beyond purely technological means. States might argue 
that this is time consuming and difficult, yet when have policing or intelligence activities not been? 
 
This isn’t the first time that society has engaged in this type of debate. The battles that raged between 
the state and the technology community throughout the 1990s in the US and elsewhere over state 
attempts to restrict the use, capabilities, and distribution of encryption technologies are a prime 
example.
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 From the state’s perspective, the spread of this technology would effectively blind its 
intelligence services and allow criminals to operate with impunity. Ultimately, encryption 
technologies became widely available, yet chaos didn’t ensue. Instead we got e-commerce and the 
proliferation of encryption in the myriad digital technologies we use today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Clearly, we aren’t currently in a position to balance the individual’s need for privacy with the law 
enforcement and intelligence needs of a wide range of states globally, while simultaneously using 
technology to its full societal and economic potential. A collision is forming between the constraints 
of the physical world in which states operate, and an unchaining of technology in the virtual world 
enhanced by cloud computing. This is occurring as individuals’ daily lives are becoming ever more 
integrated into the virtual world. In response, states have sought to transpose, sometimes 
opportunistically, their control on this virtual realm without fully appreciating the repercussions of 
their actions, or the potential implications when other states follow suit. As these states grapple for 
  
control, technology has found itself in the crossfire, as have the individuals and private-sector entities 
that rely upon it. 
 
It’s in the interest of the individual and the private sector to ensure that states cease using technology 
in a manner that unilaterally imposes their needs on a global environment. Instead, they need to be 
guided back toward the use of political and legal approaches, where collaboration with other states 
leads to the establishment of international norms. This will likely be a slow process, but technology 
isn’t a replacement for political and legal mechanisms. If states insist on taking the same approaches 
they have in the recent past, progress will soon falter, and we’ll continue to find ourselves in similar, 
or perhaps worse, situations than today, with distrust and animosity surrounding technology. 
 
The mutual interest between the individual and the private sector comes not only from a shared 
reliance on technology, but also from a deeper symbiotic relationship between the parties, particularly 
in relation to privacy. Although the private sector too often ignores this relationship, it must be 
mindful of its responsibility to the needs of the individual. Minor shifts in sentiment can have 
significant consequences for businesses and, as we’ve seen, the actions of states can dramatically 
influence sentiment. 
 
As the influence of the individual on government has waned over time, the private sector’s influence 
has grown. Some might point out that this is inherently undemocratic. There’s merit in this view, but 
it misses the point that issues surrounding privacy and the state, particularly given the rise of cloud 
computing, are global in nature. Even states that claim to be full-fledged democracies operate some 
aspects of policy and law in secrecy. The nature of technology means that the more the state integrates 
its apparatus into the technologies we rely on, the more difficult it will be to remove. To make 
progress, we’ll need to address this as soon as possible. The private sector must appreciate that 
privacy isn’t just a problem for the individual. As we take cloud computing forward and embrace all 
of its advantages, the private sector needs to recognize its pivotal role in building an acceptable future 
that balances the needs of society and the individual.  
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